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California v. Greenwood: Supreme Court Decides
To Keep The Fourth Amendment Out Of The Trash
The Framers of our Constitution, concerned with protecting American citi-
zens from unrestricted searches and seizures, drafted the words of the fourth
amendment and established "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects." 1 In the past, federal and state courts have
employed a number of rationales, primarily grounded in property law concepts
such as abandonment and curtilage,2 to determine whether fourth amendment
protection should be extended to the contents of a person's trash. Recently,
however, the United States Supreme Court in California v. Greenwood 3 held
that the proper method of analysis was to determine whether there was a reason-
able expectation of privacy in one's trash.4 A majority of the Court found that
no such expectation exists and concluded that the fourth amendment did not
prohibit warrantless searches or seizures of garbage left for collection outside the
curtilage of the home.5
This Note examines the development of the law of warrantless trash
searches and analyzes the Greenwood majority's application of the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis. The Note identifies a number of factors that
strongly support the contention that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in
a persons's trash when it is left for collection in sealed containers that shield the
contents from public view. In light of this reasonable expectation, this Note
concludes that the Supreme Court erred in denying fourth amendment protec-
tion against the warrantless police search of the defendant's trash in Greenwood.
In February 1984, a criminal suspect informed a federal drug enforcement
agent that a truck transporting illegal drugs was en route to the Laguna Beach,
California address of defendant Billy Greenwood. 6 This information was passed
on to Investigator Jenny Stracner of the local police department. Stracner had
also received reports from one of Greenwood's neighbors of heavy vehicular
traffic late at night outside the Greenwood house.7 The vehicles reportedly re-
mained at the house for only a few minutes before moving on.8
Investigator Stracner conducted surveillance of the Greenwood residence,
confirmed the vehicle traffic reports and followed one truck from the house to
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
3. 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988).
4. Id. at 1628. The Supreme Court first enunciated the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard for fourth amendment cases in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See infra notes
21, 35-39 and accompanying text.
5. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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another residence that had previously been under investigation for narcotics
trafficking.9 Her suspicions aroused, Stracner, on April 6, 1984, asked the regu-
lar trash collector to pick up garbage bags that Greenwood had deposited for
collection at the curb in front of his house and to turn them immediately over to
her.'0 The bags were opaque plastic bags and had been sealed by Greenwood
prior to disposal."
Stracner opened the bags, searched through the trash, and found items in-
dicative of narcotics use.' 2 Stracner incorporated the information derived from
the trash search into an affidavit she prepared to obtain a search warrant for the
Greenwood house.13 A search conducted following issuance of the warrant re-
vealed quantities of cocaine and hashish in the house, and Greenwood and an
accomplice were arrested on felony narcotics charges. 14
The California Superior Court dismissed the charges against Greenwood on
the authority of People v. Krivda,15 which held that warrantless trash searches
violated both the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution and arti-
cle I, section 13 of the California Constitution.' 6 The basis of the dismissal was
that due to the illegality of the trash search, the evidence obtained from this
search could not be used in the affidavits supporting the search warrant. With-
out this evidence, the trial court found there was no probable cause to search the
Greenwood home. 17 The California Court of Appeals affirmed, 18 and following
the denial of review by the California Supreme Court, the United States
Supreme Court held that the fourth amendment of the federal constitution did
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 1627.
13. Id.
14. Id. Following their arrest, Greenwood and his accomplice posted bail. After the defend-
ants were released on bail, the police received additional reports of heavy vehicular traffic outside the
Greenwood home. On May 4, 1984, a second investigator conducted a trash search in the same
manner as before, and again, evidence of narcotics was found. A second search warrant was ob-
tained and Greenwood was again arrested when narcotics were found in his home. Id. at 1627-28.
The Greenwood majority describes only these two trash searches. In fact, as the state court of
appeals opinion observes, police began to monitor the defendant's trash in February. People v.
Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (1986). This trash monitoring
continued from the last week of February to the first week of May. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at
1631 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
15. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P.2d 1262 (1971), vacated and remanded for further
proceedings sub nom. California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 1068 (1972), on
remand sub nom. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P.2d 457 (1973).
16. People v. Krivda, 8 Cal. 3d 623, 624, 504 P.2d 457, 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 521 (1973).
17. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
18. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 733, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 541 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986). The court of appeals noted a 1982 amendment to the California Constitution that prohibited
suppression of evidence seized in violation of the state constitution unless it also violated the federal
constitution. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 541; CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28(d); see In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 879, 694 P.2d 744, 747, 210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 634 (1985).
Because of this amendment, the evidence obtained from the search of Greenwood's trash could still
be used to support the warrant affidavit if Krivda was based only on the state constitution. This,
however, was not the case, stated the court of appeals, since Krivda had held that warrantless trash
searches violated both the federal and state constitutions. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 227
Cal. Rptr. at 541-42.
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not protect against warrantless searches of trash left outside the curtilage of the
home.19
The Supreme Court began its opinion by identifying the appropriate analy-
sis in fourth amendment garbage search cases. The Court held that the "war-
rantless search and seizure of the garbage bags left at the curb outside the
Greenwood house would violate the Fourth Amendment only if [Greenwood]
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in [his] garbage that society ac-
cepts as objectively reasonable." 2 0 The Court relied on Katz v. United States,
which, over twenty years ago, first developed the expectation of privacy standard
as the proper method of analysis in fourth amendment cases.
2 1
The Court appeared willing to concede that Greenwood may have mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his trash.22 The
majority, however, rejected the idea that an expectation of privacy in one's trash
is an expectation that society would view as reasonable. The Court provided
four bases for this conclusion.
First, because defendant left his garbage in an area particularly subject to
public inspection he surrendered any claim of fourth amendment protection.
23
Because it is "common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side
of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops,
and other members of the public" as well as to the prying eyes of the trash
collector, the Court concluded that the defendant could have had no reasonable
expectation of privacy.24
Second, the Court held that once defendant exposed his garbage to the pub-
lic, "the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence
of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the pub-
lic."' 25 In other words, when a person exposes incriminating evidence to the
general public as well as to the police, he cannot seriously maintain that he had a
19. California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988). The Court could possibly have
found the evidence found in the house admissible on other grounds. In particular, the Court might
have relied on the good faith exception developed in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Under Leon, illegally obtained evidence will not be suppressed if the evidence was obtained by of-
ficers acting with a warrant, and if the officers had an objectively reasonable belief in the validity of
the issuing magistrate's probable cause determination and in the technical suffiency of the warrant.
Id. at 922. The question then becomes: Would a police officer who knew the affidavit supporting the
warrant was based on a prior trash search also be expected to know that warrantless trash searches
were illegal under California law at that time? If not, then the good faith exception may be
applicable.
20. Id. at 1628.
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In Katz, Justice Harlan stated in concurrence that fourth amendment
protection must be afforded when a person has a subjective expectation of privacy and that expecta-
tion of privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). This two-part analysis has been used in numerous federal and state court decisions
since Katz. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
211 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 797
(Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125 (Wyo. 1970). The
majority in Greenwood noted that defendant acknowledged the Katz analysis as the proper standard.
Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1628-29.
25. Id. at 1629.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the evidence. A police examination of such
evidence would be reasonable per se and thus would not fall within the scope of
fourth amendment protection which is limited to "unreasonable searches and
seizures." '2
6
Third, the Court rejected the claim of privacy because defendant volunta-
rily conveyed his trash to the trash collector for disposal, holding that "'a per-
son has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns
over to third parties.' "27
Finally, the majority held that society would not recognize defendant's ex-
pectation of privacy as reasonable on precedential grounds, stating that there has
been a "unanimous rejection of similar claims" by the federal appellate courts
and that a "vast majority" of state courts of appeals have also reached the same
conclusion. 28
Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in a vigorous dissent arguing that
"[s]crutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly accepted notions of civi-
lized behavior." 29 The dissent pointed to prior Supreme Court cases that did
not involve trash but were similar in that they also concerned warrantless police
searches of sealed containers. 30 The dissent argued that the rule derived from
these prior cases is that any "'container which can support a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy may not be searched, even on probable cause, without a
warrant.' "31
The dissent also noted that the very nature of trash supports an expectation
of privacy. In the dissent's words "[a] trash bag. . . 'is a common repository for
one's personal effects' "and is, therefore, "'inevitably associated with the expec-
tation of privacy.' "32 Because many details about a person's private life can be
ascertained from a search of one's garbage, the dissent argued that there should
be no difficulty in recognizing "as reasonable an individual's expectation of pri-
vacy in the most private of personal effects sealed in an opaque container and
disposed of in a manner designed to commingle it imminently and inextricably
26. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see supra note 1.
27. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)),
28. Id. at 1629-30.
29. Id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984) (federal
agent's search of plastic bags containing white powdery substance); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727
(1877) (police search of sealed letters and packages in the mail)).
31. Id. at 1632 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120
n.17 (1984)). The dissent argues that in order for a container to support a reasonable expectation of
privacy it merely has to be sealed so as to prevent its contents from being exposed to plain view. Id.
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) (plurality opinion),
overruled, United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)). Only if the contents are exposed to plain
view or if the container is of such a nature as to "announce" or give away the identity of the contents
inside will the expectation of privacy vanish. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Robbins, 453
U.S. at 428). The dissent maintains that all other containers would support a reasonable expectation
of privacy because the Supreme Court previously rejected any attempt to distinguish between "wor-
thy" and "unworthy" containers for fourth amendment purposes. Id.; see Ross, 456 U.S. at 822 ("a
constitutional distinction between 'worthy' and 'unworthy' containers would be improper.").
32. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 762 (1979), modified by United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982)).
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with the trash of others."'3 3 This is particularly true, concludes the dissent, be-
cause American society "'chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance.' "34
The Greenwood Court recognized that the expectation of privacy standard
developed in Katz must be the focus of any fourth amendment analysis.35 The
Katz decision arose out of dissatisfaction with prior case law which appeared to
limit the fourth amendment to "searches and seizures of tangible property."
36
This limitation had led prior courts to focus on "constitutionally protected
area[s]"'3 7 when determining the scope of the amendment's protection. The Katz
Court held that this focus was improper because the fourth amendment ex-
tended beyond tangible property to protect "individual privacy."38 This protec-
tion of privacy led the Court to conclude that "the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places." '39
Although the Greenwood Court correctly relied on the expectation of pri-
vacy analysis developed in Katz, traditionally five other theories have been ap-
plied in the warrantless trash search cases: abandonment, curtilage, consent,
plain view, and exigency. 4° It is interesting to note that although the expecta-
tion of privacy analysis precludes a conclusory reliance on property law theories
like abandonment and curtilage, use of these concepts has persisited long after
Katz. As this Note will point out, even the Greenwood Court is unable to avoid
an indirect reliance on these two concepts. 4 1
Abandonment as a property concept occurs when the owner "has volunta-
rily, intentionally, and unconditionally relinquished his interest in the property
so that another, having acquired possession, may successfully assert his superior
interest." 42 Courts using the abandonment approach have stated that the in-
quiry" 'is primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words,
acts, and other objective facts.' "43 In cases factually similar to Greenwood, the
accepted rule is that the act of placing one's garbage outside the home for collec-
tion constitutes abandonment of the property. 44
The abandonment doctrine can be traced back to Hester v. United States.
45
33. Id. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
34. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
35. Id. at 1628; see supra note 21.
36. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967) (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928), overruled, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
37. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 351.
40. See Note, Expectation of Privacy Analysis and Warrantless Trash Reconnaissance After Katz
v. United States, 23 ARIz. L. REv. 283, 299-307 (1981) (describing these five theories).
41. See infra text accompanying notes 99-100, 116-119.
42. City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 306 Minn. 337, 346, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370 (1975).
43. United States v. Andersen, 663 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v.
Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409) (9th Cir. 1976)).
44. See United States v. Dela Espriella, 781 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Shelby, 573 F.2d 971, 973 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 841 (1978).
45. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
1989] 1195
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Hester, the Supreme Court held that there could be "no seizure in the sense of
the law" when police officers remove and examine an item which has been aban-
doned by its owner.46 The Court followed this reasoning in Abel v. United
States47 in which the defendant, an alien charged with espionage, was arrested,
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation searched his hotel room without a war-
rant. The agents discoverd a hollowed-out pencil and a block of wood containing
a cipher pad in a wastepaper basket inside the room. At trial, the Court upheld
the admission of these items into evidence because the defendant had abandoned
them.48 These items, concluded the Court, were bona vacantia4 9 from the de-
fendant's perspective [meaning those "things in which nobody claims as prop-
erty"]5 0 , and "[t]here can be nothing unlawful in the Government's
appropriation of such abandoned property." '5 1
Although Hester, Abel, and some more recent federal appellate cases in-
volving warrantless trash searches52 have applied abandonment as a property-
law concept to determine whether fourth amendment protection exists, this ap-
proach has been rejected by the Supreme Court. In Cardwell v. Lewis5 3 the
Court specifically stated that "[r]ather than property rights, the primary object
of the Fourth Amendment [is] ... the protection of privacy." a54 In Warden v.
Hayden 55 the Court noted that "it had previously recognized that the principal
object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than prop-
erty."' 56 The Hayden Court concluded that because of this emphasis on privacy,
the Court had "increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested
on property concepts."' 57 The Katz Court also declared that "'[t]he premise
that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited.' 58 In other words, property rights involve a determina-
tion of legal ownership or title with regard to the object searched. Because the
fourth amendment is concerned with an individual's reasonable privacy interest,
the status of the person's property rights should not be determinative.
In view of these clear Supreme Court holdings and with a proper under-
standing that privacy is the controlling interest protected by the fourth amend-
ment, reliance on the property concept of abandonment in previous warrantless
46. Id. at 58.
47. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
48. Id. at 24041.
49. Id. at 241.
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 160 (5th ed. 1979).
51. Abel, 362 U.S. at 241.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Alden, 576 F.2d 772, 777 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 855(1978) ("Because no one owns or possesses abandoned property, no one can claim a Fourth Amend-
ment interest in it."); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1971) ("nothing unlawful
in the Government's appropriation of such abandoned property.").
53. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
54. Id. at 589; see Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) (the right of privacy is "of
the very essence of constitutional liberty").
55. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
56. Id. at 304.
57. Id.; see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("Inherent Fourth Amend-
ment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of... real property law.").
58. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Hayden, 387 U.S. at 304).
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trash search cases is clearly misplaced. There is, however, a second category of
abandonment cases that have attempted to reconcile the abandonment doctrine
with the proper expectation of privacy analysis used in Katz.59 These cases rec-
ognize that there is an important
distinction between abandonment in the property-law sense and aban-
donment in the constitutional sense .... In the law of property, the
question ... is whether the owner has relinquished his interest in the
property so that another, having acquired possession, may successfully
assert his superior interest. In the law of search and seizure, however,
the question is whether the defendant has, in discarding the property,
relinquished his reasonable expectation of privacy so that its seizure
and search is reasonable within the limits of the Fourth Amendment. 60
The reasoning in these cases is that "[i]mplicit in the concept of abandon-
ment is a renunciation of any 'reasonable' expectation of privacy in the property
abandoned."'6 1 Unfortunately, few posit any rationale as to why the act of aban-
donment should lead to a per se conclusion that all expectations of privacy
cease.62 In fact, to the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that "legal posses-
sion of a seized good is not a proxy for determining whether the owner had a
Fourth Amendment interest."' 63 This is because the correct method of analysis
in fourth amendment cases after Katz is to determine whether there was a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy, requiring an examination of the particular facts
of each case. As this Note points out, there are significant factors that weigh in
favor of recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's trash.64 While
abandonment may be a factor in establishing whether an expectation of privacy
exists, the fourth amendment interests are not controlled by "arcane distinctions
developed in property... law." 65 As such, a superficial, conclusory reliance on
abandonment as a bright-line indicator of whether a reasonable privacy expecta-
tion exists is not an adequate substitute for the privacy analysis mandated by
Katz and its progeny.
A number of courts have used the concept of curtilage in warrantless trash
59. See United States v. McKennon, 814 F.2d 1539, 1545-46 (lth Cir. 1987) (per curiam);
United States v. Morales, 737 F.2d 761, 763-64 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Pirolli, 673 F.2d
1200, 1204 (1I1th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 871 (1982); United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176
(5th Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972); State v.
Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1329 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); State v. Brown, 20 Ohio App. 3d 36, 37-
38, 484 N.E.2d 215, 217-18 (1984).
60. City of St. Paul v. Vaughn, 306 Minn. 337, 346, 237 N.W.2d 365, 370-71 (1975) (citations
omitted).
61. United States v. Mustone, 469 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 1972).
62. See Note, supra note 40, at 302. "[W]hat is absolutely unwarranted is the quantum leap
from physical abandonment to a conclusive presumption of intent to waive any expectation of pri-
vacy." Id.
63. United States v. Salvu.cci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980). Indeed, it has been explicitly recognized
that "it is conceivable that property could be abandoned yet still be deemed to be within the realm of
Fourth Amendment protection." People v. Whotte, 113 Mich. App. 12, n.3, 317 N.W.2d 266, 268
n.3 (1982); see I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
§ 2.6(c) at 477 (2d ed. 1987) ("A justified expectation of privacy may exist as to items which have
been abandoned in the property law sense.").
64. See infra notes 120-40 and accompanying text.
65. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
1989] 1197
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
search cases rather than the abandonment theory. Curtilage is the area on one's
property that includes the house and the immediately adjacent property. Courts
have recognized that this area should be "afforded the most stringent Fourth
Amendment protection."'66 Underlying this rule is a recognition that "[a]t com-
mon law, the curtilage is the area to which extends the intimate activity associ-
ated with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.' "67
In the warrantless trash search cases, courts relying on the curtilage princi-
ple have held that garbage placed for collection at the curb is outside the home's
curtilage, and therefore a defendant can claim no reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy.68 These courts concede that an expectation of privacy exists in one's trash
while the trash remains on the property (within the curtilage), but at the mo-
ment it is placed off the premises for collection or is actually removed by the
trash collector the expectation of privacy vanishes.6
9
The curtilage doctrine, however, is of limited usefulness. The doctrine's per
se recognition of certain areas as deserving more "stringent" protection is incon-
sistent with the Katz Court's holding that "the correct solution of Fourth
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase
'constitutionally protected area.' "70 Recognizing that the fourth amendment
did protect privacy, the Katz Court stated that the "Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places."'71 The Court reaffirmed this sentiment in United States
v. Chadwick72 in which it held "[w]e do not agree that the Warrant Clause
protects only dwellings and other specifically designated locales."
'7 3
66. United States v. Cobler, 533 F. Supp. 407, 410 (W.D. Va. 1982) (quoting United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)).
67. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886)). An important Supreme Court case in the development of the curtilage doctrine is
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). In Hester, the Court held that the fourth amendment
protection accorded to people in their houses did not extend to "open fields" surrounding the home.
Id. at 59.
68. See United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273, 1276 (6th Cir. 1970).
69. See United States v. Biondich, 652 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975
(1981). The Supreme Court has developed a four factor test for evaluating curtilage situations in
general. See United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987). The four factors are: I) proximity
of the area to the home; 2) "whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the
home;" 3) "the nature of the uses to which the area is put;" 4) the steps taken to protect the area
from observations by passersby. Id.
In trash search cases, other courts have developed a four-part curtilage "continuum" test.
These courts evaluate the expectation of privacy by asking four questions: 1) where the trash was
located; 2) whether the dwelling is a multiple or single unit; 3) who removed the trash; 4) where the
trash search takes place. The reasoning in these decisions posits that there is a continuum, in which
trash located on the property of a single unit dwelling makes the strongest case for a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The reasonableness weakens as the trash is moved off the property or if the
trash is placed in a communal dumpster outside a multi-unit dwelling. See People v. Whotte, 113
Mich. App. 12, 317 N.W.2d 266 (1982); Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 797-98 (Alaska), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
70. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350; see United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 716 (9th Cir. 1976) ("the
'curtilage' test is no longer appropriate in ascertaining the extent of the Fourth Amendment's
protections").
71. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. But see Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974) ("The
maxim of Katz... is of only limited usefulness, for in considering what people can reasonably expect
to maintain as private we must inevitably speak in terms of places.").
72. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
73. Id. at 7. This conclusion is logical because, by its own language, the fourth amendment
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Indeed, the Court has consistently extended constitutional protection to ar-
eas well beyond the curtilage of the home,74 and, conversely, in some instances
have denied protection to areas clearly within the curtilage. 75 The rationale be-
hind these decisions is that the proper test for fourth amendment protection is
the expectation of privacy analysis. As the second circuit stated in United States
v. Arboleda,7 6 "[Defendant] is not helped by the hoary concept of 'curtilage'.
Terming a particular area curtilage expresses a conclusion; it does not advance
Fourth Amendment analysis. The relevant question is... whether the defend-
ant has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area." 77 While the location of
an object remains relevant in that it can be understood as supporting inferences
about whether a reasonable privacy expectation exists, location cannot by itself
be determinative.
In addition to the abandonment and curtilage approaches, some courts
have used a consent theory to justify warrantless trash searches. These courts
rely on the reasoning that "one of the specifically established exceptions to the
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted
pursuant to consent."' 78 In the warrantless trash search cases, the argument is
that if the defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the collection of his
garbage by trash collectors, who may themselves choose to look through the
trash, then this consent justifies a later police search of the trash once the trash is
removed from the property.79 The weaknesses in this theory are twofold. First,
even if it is established that a person freely and voluntarily consented to trash
removal and to the examination of his garbage by the trash collector, consent is
not a principle without limits,80 and it is highly unlikely that the depositor of
trash believed he was consenting to a police search of his trash as well.8 ' Sec-
ond, by focusing on whether the trash collector has removed the trash from the
extends protection to "effects" and is not limited to houses. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,
51 (1951).
74. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (warrantless search of business office that
defendant shared with others violated fourth amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)
(fourth amendment applies to citizens on the street as well as at home); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (constitutional protection extended to conversation conducted from public
phone booth); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964) (warrantless search of hotel room
unconstitutional); Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877) (letters and sealed packages in the mail
protected by the fourth amendment).
75. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1986) (warrantless low-level police recon-
naissance flight over defendant's backyard that was enclosed by two fences and shielded from view at
ground level not a violation of fourth amendment); United States v. Smith, 783 F.2d 648, 651 (6th
Cir. 1986) (the fact that driveway is within curtilage of house not determinative of constitutional
protection).
76. 633 F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1980); cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
77. Id. at 992.
78. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973).
79. See State v. Stevens, 123 Wis. 2d 303, 316, 367 N.W.2d 788, 795, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852
(1985); Croker v. State, 477 P.2d 122, 125 (Wyo. 1970).
80. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1980) (the scope of a consent search "is
limited by the terms of its authorization."); see also LO-JI Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 329
(1979) (even general invitation to the public to enter an area does not establish consent to "wholesale
searches and seizures that do not conform to Fourth Amendment guarantees.").
81. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 803 (Alaska 1973) (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
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property, "courts have merely recast the curtilage theory,"'8 2 which, by itself,
does not determine if a reasonable privacy expectation exists. 83
A fourth theory in trash search cases is the plain view theory.84 Courts
have used this theory to justify warrantless trash searches in two different in-
stances: 1) when the police enter a dwelling lawfully with some type of law
enforcement motive or purpose in mind and discover evidence in an openly ex-
posed trash container;85 and 2) when police view the exposed evidence while on
a public street following disposal of the evidence at the curb for collection.
8 6
Invocation of the plain view theory in these instances is consistent with the rea-
soning in Katz. There is no misplaced reliance on property law concepts, and
there is direct support from the Katz Court which acknowledged that "[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection,"'8 7 because there can be no reasonable
expectation of privacy in openly exposed items.88
The fifth traditional alternative in the warrantless trash search cases is the
exigent circumstances doctrine. Courts using this theory to justify searches have
pointed to the highly portable nature of trash, maintaining that police must act
quickly to avoid losing the evidence to a passerby or trash collectors.8 9 The
problems with permitting a warrantless search solely on exigency grounds are
twofold. First, it is unlikely that trash bags will be removed by passersby, and
second, because trash collection takes place on a regular schedule, police can
create their own exigency by intentionally waiting to conduct their search and
seizure until right before the scheduled collection. Moreover, while exigency
may justify seizure of the suspicious trash container, once the container has been
seized, the exigent circumstances disappear. Thus, there is no reason why police
cannot obtain a warrant while the seized trash receptacle remains in their
control. 90
The Greenwood majority avoids direct reliance on any of the five traditional
82. See Note, supra note 40, at 306.
83. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
84. The plain view exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement was articulated by
the Supreme Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court held that to
invoke the plain view theory: 1) the police must properly be in the area where the inspection takes
place; 2) the officer must discover the item in question "inadvertently"; and, 3) it must be "immedi-
ately apparent" to the police that the object in view is evidence of a crime. Id. at 466.
85. See People v. Sirhan, 7 Cal. 3d 710, 741, 102 Cal. Rptr. 385, 405-06, 497 P.2d 1121, 1141-
42 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973) (envelope with incriminating writing on its face left in
open trash box in defendant's backyard); State v. Austin, 584 P.2d 853, 856 (Utah 1978) (partially
destroyed evidence of robbery left exposed in open wastebasket inside defendant's hotel room).
86. See United States v. Stroble, 431 F.2d 1273, 1276 (6th Cir. 1970) (empty carton for stolen
television left at the curb and visible from adjacent public street).
87. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
88. The plain view doctrine would, however, be limited to cases where the trash contents are
exposed. It would not apply to trash in sealed containers.
89. See People v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 3d 222, 229-30, 118 Cal. Rptr. 523, 529 (1974); People v.
Stewart, 34 Cal. App. 3d 695, 701, 110 Cal. Rptr. 227, 230 (1973).
90. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) ("an officer's authority to possess a
package is distinct from his authority to examine its contents"); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U,S.
1, 13 (1977) (when seized footlocker was in police possession "it was unreasonable to undertake the
additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant.").
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theories discussed above and states clearly at the beginning of its opinion that
the reasonable expectation analysis developed in Katz is the proper standard for
assessing the defendant's fourth amendment claims in the case. 91 The Court
appears willing to concede that Greenwood manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy but rejects the idea that such an expectation can ever be reasonable.9 2
The majority rejects the reasonableness of this expectation because plastic
garbage bags left at the curb of a public street are "readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public" including the
trash collector, "who might himself have sorted through respondents' trash or
permitted others, such as the police, to do so."193 Because this area is" 'particu-
larly suited for public inspection,' " concludes the Court, there can be no reason-
able expectation of privacy in trash kept in this area.94 The majority's reasoning
makes sense to an extent. The public accessibility of the trash, while not itself
dispositive, should be a factor. While one may maintain a reasonable expectation
of privacy in an object left accessible to the public, the reasonableness of the
expectation would obviously be less than if the object was in a completely pro-
tected area.
The problem, however, with the majority's reliance on this argument is that
the possibility that some third party might violate the sanctity of the sealed,
opaque containers is not determinative. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Jacobsen stated that "[tihe reasonableness of an official invasion of the citizen's
privacy must be appraised on the basis of the facts as they existed at the time
that invasion occurred." 95 In Greenwood, at the time the "invasion occurred"
the trash bags were still safely sealed and remained inviolate, exposing nothing
to the police or to the outside world. As the dissent in Greenwood aptly states,
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rum-
mage through the containers does not negate the expectation of pri-
vacy in its contents any more than the possibility of a burglary negates
an expectation of privacy in the home; or the possibility of a private
intrusion negates an expectation of privacy in an unopened package; or
the possibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone conversa-
tion negates an expectation of privacy in the words spoken on the
telephone.96
Moreover, the location of the trash at the curbside, an area given to public
inspection, does not necessarily preclude a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The Katz Court held that what one "seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected."' 97 In addition, the
91. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628. The Court, however, is unable to divorce itself entirely from
the concepts of curtilage and abandonment. See infra text accompanying notes 99-100 & 116-19.
92. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
93. Id. at 1628-29.
94. Id. at 1629 (quoting United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 1981)).
95. 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984); see United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528, 1534 (11th Cir.
1985).
96. 108 S. Ct. at 1636 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52. In Katz, the content of the defendant's telephone conversation
made from a public telephone booth was protected by the fourth amendment. Id. at 353.
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Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a governmental invasion of privacy can-
not be justified because a person's expectation of privacy toward the particular
area is less than absolute.98 The Greenwood Court's reliance on the concept of
curtilage here is also problematic. Although the Court states that it is following
a strict Katz expectation of privacy analysis, the majority specifically holds that
there is no fourth amendment protection for "garbage left for collection outside
the curtilage of the home." 99 This implies that the Court would have reached a
different conclusion if the trash had been located within the curtilage. Such a
result is troublesome because a legitimate expectation of privacy in a container is
not worth very much if can be destroyed by merely moving the container a few
feet farther from the house. More importantly common law property concepts,
like curtilage, by themselves have no talismanic effect on fourth amendment pro-
tection. 100 At best, these concepts support inferences about the reasonableness
of an expectation of privacy; alone, however, they are never determinative.
The Supreme Court has stated that if a private party violates the sanctity of
a sealed container, the police may examine the container's contents "to the ex-
tent that they ha[ve] already been examined by third parties." 10 1 This rule does
not, however, lead to the conclusion that because a private third party may hy-
pothetically intrude upon the container the police may conduct a warrantless
search of the container.1 0 2 Permitting a governmental search of a container's
contents following their exposure by a private party is based on the idea that the
individual's expectation of privacy has already been compromised by the private
party. 10 3 This, however, was not the case in Greenwood, in which no third party
had opened the containers prior to the police search.
This brings us to the Court's second argument. The majority states that the
search was justified because "police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their
eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any
member of the public." 104 The Court is absolutely right; it would be unreasona-
ble to expect police not to examine evidence left exposed for all to see. This was
98. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (fourth amendment protection extended
to defendant's desk and file cabinets even though hospital staff had access to office); Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (expectation of privacy in office protected as to government intru-
sion even though defendant shared office with other union officials); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483, 489-90 (1964) (police search of hotel room unconstitutional even though janitorial staff could
enter); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961) (search of defendant's house violated
fourth amendment even though landlord had authority to enter for limited purposes).
99. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627.
100. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
101. Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980). The intrusion by the private party is not
a violation of the fourth amendment because the amendment applies only to governmental intru-
sions. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984); Burdeau v. McDowell 256 U.S. 465,
475 (1921); United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S.
952 (1979).
102. Indeed, even when a private party has conducted a preliminary search, police authority to
search is still circumscribed. See Walter, 447 U.S. at 657 ("the Government may not exceed the
scope of the private search unless it has the right to make an independent search"). Moreover, the
Katz Court ruled that what one "knowingly exposes to the public" is unprotected by the fourth
amendment, not what might be exposed to the public. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
103. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 121.
104. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629.
[Vol. 671202
WARRANTLESS TRASH SEARCHES
one of the bases for the Supreme Court's prior development of the plain view
doctrine.105 The Greenwood majority's reasoning on this point is directly sup-
ported by Katz. The Katz Court stated, "What a person knowingly exposes to
the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection." 10 6 Unfortunately, one is left to wonder why this argument
appears in the majority's decision in Greenwood. At the time of the warrantless
search of Greenwood's sealed trash bags, no evidence of criminal conduct
"could have been observed by any member of the public," and therefore the
police were not required to "avert their eyes" from anything.
A third basis for the majority's holding in Greenwood is that" 'a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties' "10 7 -in this case the trash collector. The Court's conclusion here
appears to be grounded in prior decisions in United States v. White 10 8 and Hoffa
v. United States. 10 9 These cases questioned whether fourth amendment protec-
tion was to be extended to the content of "private" conversations that took place
between a defendant and a government informer. In both cases the Court stated
that the answer was no because "one contemplating illegal activities must realize
and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police".' 10 The Hoffa
Court concluded that the fourth amendment does not protect "a wrongdoer's
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing
will not reveal it."' 11
Cases like White and Hoffa are, however, clearly distinguishable from trash
search cases like Greenwood.112 As Chief Justice Rabinowitz points out in his
dissenting opinion in Smith v. State,113 a trash search case decided by the Alas-
kan Supreme Court:
Hoffa and the instant case, however, are distinguishable. There the de-
fendants knowingly and voluntarily communicated certain incriminat-
ing information to a third person who turned out to be a paid informer;
a communication to another was intentionally initiated and under-
taken. Having intentionally conducted such communication, the de-
fendants were obliged to assume the risk that the recipient of the
communication might turn out to be a governmental agent. Their ex-
pectation of privacy, under such circumstances, was necessarily dimin-
ished. Here, the facts suggest that no such knowing or voluntary
disclosure of the contents of the closed garbage bag to the collectors or
any other person was initiated or attempted by appellant. If anything,
the facts would seem to suggest that appellant and her husband ex-
105. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-68 (1971); Ker v. California, 374 U.S.
23, 43 (1963).
106. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
107. Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
108. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
109. 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
110. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
111. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302.
112. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 63, § 2.6(c), at 485 (distinguishing White and Hoffa from
warrantless trash cases).
113. 510 P.2d 793 (Alaska), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1086 (1973).
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pected the refuse collectors to "commingle" or destroy the garbage. If
appellant had deposited personal letters rather than contraband into
the dumpster, it could not be seriously maintained that she voluntarily
and knowingly meant to communicate the contents of such letters to
the collectors or police. 14
Chief Justice Rabinowitz describes the act of trash disposal more accurately
than the majority in Greenwood. What is directly conveyed to the trash collector
is not the evidence of a crime, but a sealed, opaque trash container. Garbage
collectors do not stop repeatedly to look through every bag of refuse left for
removal; and even if one "might expect some minor, inadvertent examination by
garbagemen or other third persons .... such expectations would not necessarily
include a detailed, systematized inspection of the garbage by law enforcement
personnel." 115
Equally unpersuasive is the Greenwood majority's assertion that their con-
clusion "is reinforced by the unanimous rejection of similar claims by the Fed-
eral Courts of Appeals" as well as a "vast majority" of state appellate courts.1 16
The Court cites eleven federal appellate court cases and fifteen state appellate
court cases in support of its conclusion. t 17 Upon closer examination, however,
and as the Greenwood dissent observes, most of these cases based their decision
"entirely or almost entirely on an abandonment theory." 118 As discussed ear-
lier, because the emphasis of the fourth amendment is on privacy, state property
law concepts such as abandonment are not controlling." 9 Consequently,
whatever precedential support the majority draws from these lower court cases
that rely on the abandonment theory is limited at best.
In addition to the weaknesses in the Greenwood Court's reasoning, it over-
looks significant factors that support a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
trash and that militate against permitting warrantless search of trash containers
without probable cause. First, and most obvious, warrantless police searches of
trash are inconsistent with the fourth amendment's general requirement of a
search warrant as a matter of policy. Warrantless searches are "per se unreason-
able . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions."120
Second, when a police officer, in the absence of any controlling standard,
can randomly pick through any number of trash containers on a particular street
and continue to do so until he finds evidence of a crime, he violates the well-
established prohibition against "arbitrary invasions [of privacy] by governmental
114. Id. at 804 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 803 (Rabinowitz, C.J., dissenting).
116. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1633-34 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
119. See supra notes 42-65 and accompanying text. Although some of the decisions cited by the
majority attempt to link abandonment with the proper expectation of privacy analysis, none satisfac-
torily establish why abandonment should automatically negate the privacy expectation in all circum-
stances. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65.
120. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357; see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
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officials." 12 1 The result in Greenwood does not merely permit police to search a
criminal's garbage, but permits police to arbitrarily search anyone's garbage.
Third, by not requiring a warrant for these types of searches, the Court has,
for all purposes, sanctioned the use of an otherwise illegal "general warrant"1 22
by police. By permitting the police to bypass the fourth amendment warrant
requirement, which mandates that police describe with particularity the place to
be searched and items to be seized, the Greenwood Court allows police to con-
duct "a general exploratory search from one object to another until something
incriminating at last emerges." 12 3 Even if no incriminating evidence is found,
the Court has, at the very least, provided police with a unique tool for harassing
individuals, particularly in cases in which the police conduct repeated trash
searches over a period of time.1 24
Fourth, a very strong case can be made for recognizing a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy that is objectively reasonable by societal standards under the
factual circumstances of Greenwood. The very nature of trash supports this con-
clusion. A single trash bag is a unique, aggregate source of information about a
person's political, financial, medical, religious, and sexual beliefs and prac-
tices.' 2 5 To quote the Greenwood dissent, "It cannot be doubted that a sealed
trash bag harbors telling evidence of the 'intimate activity associated with the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life,' which the Fourth Amend-
ment is designed to protect." 12 6
Fifth, defendant here disposed of his garbage in a sealed, opaque container
which protected its contents from scrutiny. Other courts in other contexts have
held that a sealed bag or package supports an inference of an expectation of
privacy.' 27 In addition, any attempt to distinguish between one type of sealed
container and another when performing an expectation of privacy analysis is
entirely inconsistent with the Supreme Court's refusal to distinguish between
"worthy" and "unworthy" containers in fourth amendment search and seizure
cases.128 Moreover, when one deposits trash at the curbside, he expects that the
trash will be destroyed, buried or, at the very least, commingled 129 with the
121. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967); see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 654 (1979); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 895 (1975).
122. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583-84 (1980) (general warrants "were the immediate
evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.").
123. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466.
124. In Greenwood, for example, the trash searches took place over several months. See supra
note 14.
125. See Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting); People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d
1096, 1104, 80 Cal. Rptr. 633, 638, 458 P.2d 713, 718 (1969); State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274, 1276-
77 (Hawaii 1985).
126. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1634 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886))).
127. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1981); United
States v. Goshorn, 628 F.2d 697, 701 (1st Cir. 1980).
128. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982). The Ross Court continued: "a traveler
who carries a toothbrush and a few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf [may] claim
an equal right to conceal his possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with
the locked attache case." Id.
129. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1637 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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trash of others. This commingling process effectly severs any connection be-
tween the trash and its original owner and further validates a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy.
Finally, local ordinances, as they do in many communities, required Green-
wood to dispose of his trash in this manner.130 It is irrelevant that the purpose
of these ordinances may be to effect sanitation and not privacy; one can reason-
ably infer from these ordinances that only trash collectors and not others will
handle his trash.' 31 It would also be improper to require that in order to main-
tain a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's trash that the owner must
forego use of ordinary methods of trash collection. Many people cannot afford
paper shredders or trash compactors 132 and burning of trash is often prohibited.
Moreover,
[i]t would be a perversion of Katz to interpret it as extending protec-
tion only to those who resort to extraordinary means to keep informa-
tion regarding their personal lives out of the hands of police. 'Mr.
Katz could, of course, have protected himself against surveillance by
forbearing to use the phone', but the fact that he did not do so did not
deprive him of a justified expectation of privacy in the public telephone
booth.133
The Greenwood Court states that even if there was a subjective expectation
of privacy, it could not be found objectively reasonable under these circum-
stances. 134 The Court, however, forgets that trash left in a sealed container is of
a highly personal nature. As the Greenwood dissent observes, "Most of us, I
believe, would be incensed to discover a meddler-whether a neighbor, a re-
porter, or a detective-scrutinizing our sealed trash containers .... 1,3s Indeed,
in 1975 when a reporter searched the trash of then-Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger and then wrote an article about what he had discovered, the public
responded by condemning the reporter.136 Commentators characterized the re-
porter's actions as "indefensible... as civilized behavior,"' 137 and "a disgusting
invasion of personal privacy"' 138 that was contrary to "the way decent people
behave in relation to each other."' 139 In view of such a reaction, it is difficult to
understand how the Greenwood majority concludes that "society as a whole"
130. Id. at 1636-37.
131. See State v. Schultz, 388 So. 2d 1326, 1330 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.) (Anstead, J., dissenting)
(by placing trash in a location for collection the owner is entitled to reasonably expect that it will be
removed only by those authorized to do so). But see United States v. Vahalik, 606 F.2d 99, 101 (5th
Cir. 1979) (purpose of municipal trash ordinance is to effect cleanliness and not to create an expecta-
tion of privacy), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
132. See Note, supra note 40, at 304.
133. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 63, § 2.6(c), at 478-79 (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REy. 349, 403 (1974)).
134. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1628.
135. Id. at 1635 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington Post, July 10, 1975, at A18, col. 1.
(editorial)).
138. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Flieger, Investigative Trash, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., July 28, 1975, at 72 (editor's page)).
139. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting)
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does not consider one's expectation of privacy in trash as reasonable.14 °
Having established that there is ample evidence of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in one's trash, it is interesting to note that the Court would not, in the
alternative, be able to justify its opinion by holding that the police search in
Greenwood was reasonable and thus not subject to fourth amendment restric-
tions. 14 1 As the Supreme Court has said in the past, a search may be considered
reasonable only if the police need to search outweighs the resulting invasion of
privacy. 142 In Greenwood, the police suspected the defendant of drug trafficking.
The Supreme Court previously held in United States v. Place 14 3 that it is not
necessary to obtain a search warrant to screen an item with a drug-sniffing
dog. 144 When the occasion for a trash search arises in a narcotics case like
Greenwood, the trash could be screened by these dogs without opening the sealed
container and violating the owner's privacy rights. 145 A positive reaction from
the dog would provide probable cause for a warrant to search the container. If
removal of the bag by a passerby or trash collector appeared imminent, the bag
could be seized and held unopened pending receipt of the warrant.
Not only would this be a reasonable procedure, striking an effective balance
between the law enforcement needs of the police and society and the rights of the
individual, but in Greenwood it could have been done with no difficulty whatso-
ever. Although the Court's decision is silent on this matter, the state court opin-
ion informs us that police did at one point have a drug-sniffing dog on the scene
to check out a suspicious truck parked in front of the Greenwood home.14 6 As a
result, the police need to physically search the contents of Greenwood's trash
did not outweigh the defendant's personal privacy rights, and thus, the search
cannot be deemed reasonable.
In light of these six factors and in the absence of a compelling law enforce-
ment interest in the warrantless trash search, a better approach would be to
presume a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in trash in sealed, opaque
140. Id. at 1630-31 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. The fourth amendment only prohibits "unreasonable" searches and seizures. See United
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985); supra note 1.
142. See New Jersey v. T.L.O, 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985) (citing Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387
U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967)).
143. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
144. Id. at 707 (exposure of respondent's luggage to a trained canine in a public place did not
constitute a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment).
145. See generally Loewy, The Fourth Amendment As A Device For Protecting The Innocent, 81
MICH. L. REv. 1229, 1244-48 (1983) (discussing use of the drug-sniffing dog as an "evidence-de-
tecting divining rod").
146. People v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 732, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539, 540 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 1625 (1988). This does not imply that warrantless trash searches will only be
unreasonable in drug trafficking cases. They may very well be unreasonable in other contexts as
well. In determining reasonableness one must analyze all the "circumstances surrounding the
search" and balance the need for a particular search against the invasion of personal rights. United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 537 (1985). The fact that a warrantless trash search
may expedite a police investigation, however, does not obviate the need for a warrant. The Supreme
Court has stated explicitly, "the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can
never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393
(1978).
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containers.147 This presumption may be weakened by the location of the
container, but not negated. Situations that would defeat this presumption would
include: 1) trash discarded without any type of container and left in plain view;
2) trash left in a type of container that reveals the identity of the contents; 148 3)
containers whose sanctity had already been violated by a third-party search.
One final observation is necessary. One commentator has observed, to es-
tablish that
people do have a justified expectation of privacy in their garbage is
only to say that an examination of that garbage by the police is a
search and therefore subject to Fourth Amendment constraints. Just
what those constraints are is another matter. This expectation of pri-
vacy, 'although considerable, is less intense and insistent' than the ex-
pectation of privacy which one has as to his home, and thus it should
not be concluded that the search of garbage is bounded by precisely the
same limitations which are applicable to a search inside a dwelling. 149
In other words, having established that sealed trash containers deserve fourth
amendment protection, it would still be possible for a jurisdiction to permit
searches of such containers without a warrant provided that police could articu-
late a legitimate justification for the search.
For example, the Supreme Court has authorized warrantless searches of
automobiles and their contents provided that there is probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains contraband.1 50 The justification for this exception to
the warrant requirement is that automobiles enjoy a lesser, although still reason-
able, expectation of privacy than the home, and that automobiles are highly mo-
bile, making it impractical to obtain a warrant.1 5 ' While trash containers are
less likely to be moved than automobiles, trash containers are portable and are
not generally accorded the same privacy expectations that a house receives.
Thus, an analogy can be drawn between the warrantless search cases involving
automobiles and trash containers.15 2 Requiring a showing of probable cause in
trash search cases, but not demanding that the police obtain a warrant, would be
a reasonable balance between the competing law enforcement needs of the police
and society and the fourth amendment privacy interests of the individual.
The Greenwood Court, however, by neglecting to require probable cause or
any other standard of suspicion in the warrantless trash search cases, fails to
take into account the private and confidential nature of trash, and overestimates
society's tolerance for systematized violations of sealed trash containers and gov-
147. Although Greenwood establishes that there is no protection against warrantless search and
seizures of trash under the federal constitution, the states remain able to grant such protection under
their own constitutions. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630.
148. For example, transparent containers or those that conform to the shape of the object inside
might disclose their contents. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764 n.13 (1979), modified,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
149. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 63, § 2.6(c), at 486 (quoting People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871,
882, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 312, 512 P.2d 1208, 1216 (1973)).
150. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823 (1982).
151. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-91 (1985).
152. See People v. Parker, 44 Cal. App. 3d 222, 230, 118 Cal. Rptr. 523, 529 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974) (drawing similar analogy between automobile and trash searches).
1208 [Vol. 67
WARRANTLESS TRASH SEARCHES
ernmental scrutiny of their contents. Those who feel that such violations would
never be visited upon mainstream society and will only happen to those who,
perhaps like Greenwood, deserve it, should note that at no time did the police
contend that they had probable cause to believe Greenwood was involved in
criminal activity. 153 The warrantless police searches of Greenwood's trash in-
fringed on a reasonable expectation of privacy and, without at least a showing of
probable cause, violated the fourth amendment.
JAMES DEMAREST SECOR, III
153. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1631-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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